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Abstract 
 
Profit sharing concept fascinates various points of views, such as decision makers, media, academicians, 
etc., since remarkable work paper published by Weitzman (1984, 1985). Wage bargaining theory is 
undoubtedly a vital factor in profit sharing system. This research uses Nash bargaining solution in order 
to obtain the optimal agreement point over wages and employment. Unfortunately, most of the study done 
on the same topic assumed that the workers receive share of profit equally. Logically, each of the workers 
has different qualifications which are affect their productivity. A different assumption of the workers 
heterogeneity is used in this research in order to reduce the probability of unfairness among the workers 
because of the equality portion of profit sharing.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Basically, profit sharing is a system where the workers receive a portion of the company’s 
profit. The system has been fascinated various point of views since remarkable claims by 
Weitzman (1984, 1985). The concept declares that profit sharing is associated with higher 
productivity.  Other than that, the concept creates an incentive that move the economy to full 
employment. There were numerous researchers have studied the system of profit sharing with 
different approaches, such as Von Lanzenauer (1969), Anderson and Devereux (1989), Leslie 
(1996), Hori (2003), Hainaut (2009), Kraft and Lang (2010), etc. 
Stewart (1989) studied the profit sharing concepts on Cournot oligopoly. The study 
concluded there was a positive incentive if the company implemented the profit sharing system. 
Koskela and Stenbacka (2005) analyzed the relationship between profit sharing, worker effort 
and wage formation when firms face uncertainty generated by a stochastic revenue shock. The 
analysis focused on the implications of the relative timing of profit sharing and wage bargaining 
for the optimal profit sharing. Hainaut (2009) proposed an alternative method to optimize both 
profit sharing and the asset allocation based on a stochastic control approach in the context of 
life insurance contracts. Sarmah, et al. (2007) developed a new procedure for fair profit 
distribution through credit mechanism when there were target profit by both the parties and 
when there was no target profit from the business. 
Profit sharing is a good method to make the workers feel like they own the company. This 
sentiment increases their loyalty toward company. If a company implement profit sharing 
accurately, it’s very useful to increase both of company’s productivity and workers management 
strategy. The system encourages the workers to work harder towards final goal that is 
maximizing company’s profit. Moreover, the workers fascinate to find out how the company 
proceeds and company’s turnover too. In this case, the communication between the company
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and the workers are very important because they need information about what happen to the 
company. 
Wage bargaining theory is undoubtedly a vital factor in profit sharing system. The 
process of negotiation on wages and employment between the company and workers usually 
uses the theory of wage bargaining popularized by Nash in 1950. Nash bargaining theory is 
used to represent the process of negotiation in order to get an agreement about the amount of 
company’s profit to be shared to its workers. The process has a range from minutes to months; 
even years or the results may produce zero agreement. Usually, the results of negotiation 
process depend on both parties; whether there is goodwill on both sides in order to get a point of 
agreement.  
The purpose of this paper is to build a mathematical model of an optimal labor contract 
by bargaining process on wages and employment between the owner and the workers. The 
contract is derived from an intersection point of the demands of both parties. Most of the studies 
done on the same topic are used the homogeneous of the workers. The existing models assume 
that each worker receives equals share of company’s profit. In fact, there are different 
qualifications may affect the amount of the income of each worker.  The difference assumption 
of the workers is used in this paper to face the unfairness among workers because of the same 
portion of profit sharing. Other than that, it is expected reduce the biasness may arise in the 
estimation.  
2. NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION 
Nash bargaining theory uses to represent the process of negotiation in order to get an 
agreement about the amount of company’s profit to be shared to its workers. This game theory 
is defined as a game between two or more players to model the bargaining interactions. The 
players have demands, in this case is the percentage of profit sharing, which is filed in the 
bargaining process. If both of players request the amount of profit sharing is smaller than 
company’s profit, then both of them get their demands. This means that the bargaining process 
produces outputs that facilitate the demands of both players. On the contrary, if the amount is 
requested by both players are greater than company’s profit, and then they do not get their 
demands. This means that the negotiation process is failed. 
In game theory, Nash equilibrium is a solution concept that use a series of negotiation 
strategies involves two or more parties where each party is assumed already knows about the 
opponent’s strategies. Mathematically, this game theory can be defined as follows. Assume that 
two players negotiate a problem that contains disagreement or threat on point         , 
where    and    are payoff of the first player and second player, respectively, and feasibility set 
F, a closed convex subset of   are the elements defined as an agreement, then           
  . The problem is nontrivial if an agreement in F is better than a disagreement for both parties. 
The purpose of negotiation is to choose the possibility of an agreement   in F produce by the 
process of negotiation. Then             
               (Nash, 1950) 
In the context of economic efficiency, the strongly-efficient model of wage bargaining is 
defined when employment has to be set at the level where the value of marginal product of 
workers equivalent with the cost of an hour for workers. In this model, both of the company and 
the workers agree the levels of wage and employment based only on the opportunity wage of 
workers and the value of marginal product of workers. This model has the union objective 
function as follows 
                2.1 
 
where      is an increasing monotonic function and    represents the opportunity wage of 
workers (Farber, 2001). Let the utility function of the company be the company’s net profit, 
then the efficient wage-employment bargaining solution following Nash product should be 
maximized with the respect to   and  : 
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 2.2 
 
In fact, wages and employment relevantly are set in a bargaining problem. The workers-
demand-curve model in the context of bargaining problem display there are changes in the 
wages but the combination of wages and employment consistently on the workers demand curve 
(Farber, 2001). 
 
3. LABOR CONTRACT UNDER PROFIT SHARING SYSTEM 
As mentioned above, most of the studies done on the same topic consider the worker 
factor with the homogeneous assumption of worker so that the amount of profit sharing is 
divided to all workers equally. Other parameters attach to the workers, which may have effects 
on the portion of profit sharing are neglected. For example is the period of working time, 
education, position, and so on. A senior worker does not receive the same basic salary to the 
new workers. Logically, senior workers and new workers also do not inherit the same portion of 
profit sharing. This argument applies to the other parameters attach to the workers because the 
workers have some qualifications that permit affect their revenues, not only the basic wage but 
also the portion of profit sharing. Consequently, it cannot be ignored in the construction of the 
proposed model of profit sharing. 
Therefore, this research offers a new model of profit sharing that covers these 
parameters so that it gains an ideal profit sharing scheme which satisfies all of the parties. Thus 
follow the Weitzman analogy (1985), the formula of profit sharing between the company and 
the workers which is considering the parameters attach to the workers can be defined as follows: 
 
         
          
 
 3.1 
 
where            Equation (3.1) indicates that worker i receive a basic salary     and the 
portion of profit sharing   
          
 
. The last part is the focus of discussion in this study where 
i in the    represent the coefficient of profit sharing which is including the parameters of the 
workers, i.e. their individual qualifications. Because of that, coefficient of profit sharing     
move from zero to one,       . Equation (3.1) indicates that the workers do not get the 
same profit share; on the contrary it depends on the total amount of     which is representing 
individual qualification for each worker. Based on both of the equation (3.1) and the above 
explanation, the following corollary can be derived: 
 
Corollary 1 
If      
 
  then the worker will receive a full portion of profit sharing and if     
 
  then 
the worker will receive a zero portion of company’s profit. 
 
Corollary 1 shows that if        then      . It implicates that if a worker do not meet the 
requirements in the employment contract that mutually agreed by both of the company and the 
workers, then he is not entitled to a share of company’s profits. The worker only receives the 
basic wage     because the value of his profit sharing coefficient equal to zero. 
Suppose that the wage-employment bargaining solution is obtained by splitting the 
company’s net profit to two parties, i.e., the owner and the workers. Assume that the relative 
bargaining power of union is symbolized by  , and then the relative wage bargaining power of 
the company is    . Based on Svejnar (1986), the unique Nash bargaining solution 
is            with respect to both wages and employment,    and  . Based on the 
equation (2.1) and the equation (2.2) the efficient wage-employment bargaining between the 
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company and the workers can be defined as follows. Suppose the number of workers in the 
company is defined as   , and the utility of company is the net profit, which is as follows 
 
                                   (3.2) 
 
Equation (3.2) shows the function of company’s net profit under the introduction of profit 
sharing system. The equation indicates there is     that affect the company’s net profit. The 
greater    , then company’s net profit is smaller. This make sense because     is the company’s 
expenditure. Whereas the objective function of the union is followed Anderson and Devereux 
(1989) which is entirely depended on the basic wages     of each worker and the 
employment     , that is 
 
                                   (3.3) 
 
Where        twice differentiable of utility function and it is a concave 
function,           and  
         . The labour utility is normal, so that          where 
    is the probability of the available wages. Suppose      represent the number of the workers 
in unions, where        . If an agreement cannot be reached in the negotiation process, then 
the utility function of labour is           .  
In relation to the profit sharing system, wage bargaining problem can be described as 
follows. Let the company implements the profit sharing system rather than the fixed wage 
system to its workers. While the company’s net profit after the distribution of profit sharing to 
its workers is as in equation (3.2). Then the efficient wage-employment bargaining in the 
system of profit sharing is defined as a pair           and given     , then  
 
   
        
              
                         
 
 (3.4) 
   
        
                         
     
                
 
  
 
Equation (3.4) based on both     and   . Therefore, the solution of the equation differentiated 
by respect to both of them, as shown below: 
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which produce the final solution as follows: 
 
          
                
   
  
          
     
  3.5 
 
And 
 
      
                 
   
 
                                            
      
   
 
3.6 
 
From equation (3.5) and equation (3.6) and suppose that         then equation (3.1) satisfies 
(a)      
 ; (b)      
 
.   
 
 
4. CONCLUSION  
This paper considers wage-employment bargaining in order to obtain an optimal labor 
contract between the company and the workers. A new assumption which is considering the 
heterogeneity of the workers is used to reduce the unfairness that may appear among the 
workers. 
5. REFERENCES  
 
[1]  Anderson, Simon and Devereux, Michael. (1989). Profit Sharing and Optimal Labour 
Contracts. Canadian Journal og Economics, xxii(2), 425-433 
[2]  Farber, H. (2001). Notes on the Economics of Labor Unions. Working Papers no 452. 
Industrial Relations Section, Princeton University. 
[3]   Hainaut, D. (2009). Profit Sharing: A Stochastic Control Approach. ESC Rennes. 35065 
Rennes, Frances 
[4]   Hori, K. (2003). Profit Sharing as the Optimal Wage Contract. PhD Thesis. University of 
Cambridge 
[5]   Koskela, Erkki and Stenbacka, Rune. (2005). Flexible and Committed Profit Sharing with 
Wage Bargaining. University of Helsinksi, Finland 
[6]   Kraft, K and Lang, J. (2010). Estimating Selectivity-Corrected Productivity Effects of 
Profit Sharing.  
[7]    Leslie, Derek. (1996). The Simple Economics of Profit Sharing Schemes. Economic Issues 
1, 65-71 
[8]   Nash, J. F. (1950). The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica 18, 155-162. 
[9]   Sarmah, S.P., et al. (2007). Coordination and Profit sharing between a Manufacturer and a 
Buyer with Target Profit under Credit Option. European Journal of Operational Research 
182, 1469-1478 
[10] Stewart, Geoff. (1989). Profit Sharing in Cournout Oligopoly. Economic Letters 31, 221-
224 
[11] Svejnar, J. (1986). Bargaining Power, Fear of Disagreement and Wage Settlements: 
Theory and Evidence from U.S. Industry. Econometrica 54 (5), 1055-1078. 
[12] Von Lanzenauer, C. (1969). A Model for Determining Optimal Profit Sharing Plans. The 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 4(1), 53-63 
[13] Weitzman, M.L. (1984). Sunk Cost and Strategic Commitment: A Proposed three-stage 
Equilibrium. Economic Journal 94, 370-378 
  
Umi Mahmudah / A Model for                                                                              ISBN 978-979-99314-8-1.   
 
M-136 
 
 
[14] Weitzman, M.L. (1985). The Simple Macroeconomics of Profit Sharing. American 
Economic Review 75, 937-953 
[15] Weitzman, M.L. (1987). Steady State Unemployment Under Profit Sharing. Economic 
Journal 97, 86-105 
 
